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Incentivizing Safer Sexual Behavior: Evidence from a
Lottery Experiment on HIV Prevention
By MARTINA BJÖRKMAN NYQVIST, LUCIA CORNO, DAMIEN DE WALQUE, AND
JAKOB SVENSSON
We investigate the effect of a financial lottery program in Lesotho with
relatively low expected payments but a chance to win a high prize con-
ditional on negative test results for sexually transmitted infections. The
intervention resulted in a 21.4 percent reduction in HIV incidence over
two years. Lottery incentives appear to be particularly effective in tar-
geting individuals with ex ante risky sexual behavior, consistent with the
hypothesis that lotteries are more valued by individuals willing to take
risks.
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I. Introduction
An estimated 1.2 million new HIV infections occurred in Africa alone in 2016, adding
to the nearly 26 million people living with HIV on the continent. New infections continue
to outpace antiretroviral therapy uptake in most developing countries (UNAIDS, 2016).
Thus the global need for effective HIV prevention programs remains urgent.
In this paper we present the results from a financial incentive program designed in the
form of a lottery with low expected payments ($20-$40 per year) conditional on testing
negative for two markers of risky sexual behaviors (two curable sexually transmitted
infections, STI), but with relatively high payments for lottery winners.
The use of lotteries in public health interventions is not unprecedented, including in
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the area of HIV prevention.1 To the best of our knowledge, however, this is the first
large scale randomized trials to assess its impact as a prevention tool.2 Introducing a
gamble into an otherwise standard financial incentive program, such as a conditional
cash transfer, has at least two potential advantages. First, with lotteries, the program
becomes relatively more attractive to individuals that are willing to take monetary risks.
If individuals exhibiting risk-loving preferences in monetary gambles are also more risk-
loving in other domains, including sexual behavior, lottery incentives may better target
those at higher risk of HIV/AIDS. Second, there is growing evidence from psychology
and behavioral economics that people tend to overestimate small percentages, and there-
fore prefer a small chance at a large reward to a small reward for sure (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979, Kahneman, 2011, Barberis, 2013). If so, the perceived return from par-
ticipating in a lottery may be higher than the return from an incentive program that pays
the expected return with certainty, or likewise, lotteries may provide stronger incentives
for behavioral change compared to a traditional conditional cash transfer.
We find that HIV incidence in the intervention groups fell by 21.4 percent relative to
the control group over a two-year period and estimate that the cost of averting a primary
HIV infection was $882, or about one-tenth of the costs of averting an HIV infection
in the only other behavioral trial documenting significant reduction in HIV prevalence
(Baird et al., 2012).3 Consistent with the reduction in risky sexual behavior, we also
document large reductions in both the prevalence of STI and in births and pregnancies,
especially among single women.
Despite the lack of a certainty equivalent intervention arm, we provide suggestive ev-
idence that the lottery design played an important role in achieving the effects we docu-
ment. Using baseline data from the control group, we show that risk-lovers – with the de-
gree of risk aversion measured using a simple multiple price list design – were more than
twice as likely to become infected with HIV over the trial period, thus providing support
for the assumption that risk-loving behavior in hypothetical monetary gambles translates
to objectively measured risk-loving sexual behavior. In the intervention groups, on the
other hand, where participants were offered lottery incentives to promote safer sexual
behavior, we find that the risk-loving individuals were as likely as risk-averse individu-
1The HIV screening lottery in the Western Cape province in South Africa is probably the most notable example.
The lottery, developed as a pilot by a Harvard-affiliated organization set up to develop psychology and economics-based
strategies for social policy – aims at encouraging people to get tested for HIV (Keating, 2013). Another well-known
example of the use of lotteries in public health programs is the 1957 Tuberculosis-screening campaign implemented in
Glasgow. Geffen (2011) reports that intense media coverage and a weekly prize draw resulted in a number of screenings
almost three times higher than the initial aim of reaching 250,000 people.
2Recent trials have used lottery incentives to improve adherence to blood thinners (Volpp et al., 2008b; Kimmel
et al., 2016) and to a 6-month vaccination protocol (Stitzer et al., 2010). They generally find that lottery incentives
led to an improvement in the adherence measures compared to the control group. Two US studies compare lottery
incentives with some type of fixed payment incentives. Volpp et al. (2008a) compare lottery incentives and a deposit or
commitment device contract whereby participants pledge upfront their own money as incentives for weight loss. During
the 16 weeks incentive period, both incentives led to similar reductions in weight compared to the control group, even
though the average amount of money earned was not similar across the two groups, but those effects were not sustained
at a seven months weigh-in. Haisley et al. (2012) compare lottery incentives combined with a group-level incentive
with the certainty equivalent (of the lottery incentives) incentives in an intervention aimed at encouraging members of
an organization to complete individual health risk assessments. The lottery and group level incentives outperformed the
fixed payment incentives and the control group.
3HIV incidence is the flow of new infections; HIV prevalence is the stock of existing infections.
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als to become HIV infected during the two-year trial period. That is, the lottery program
lowered HIV incidence rates in the treatment relative to the control group by making
individuals with greater preference for risk at baseline behave similarly to risk-averse
individuals in terms of their sexual behavior.
Our paper relates to the growing literature on prevention programs for HIV/AIDS.
Such programs can be broadly divided into two types: biomedical interventions that aim
at reducing susceptibility to HIV, holding behavior constant, and interventions aimed at
reducing risky sexual behavior. Several biomedical interventions, such as male circum-
cision and pre-exposure prophylaxis, have been shown to significantly reduce HIV trans-
mission in field trials (Gray et al., 2007; Bailey et al., 2007; and Auvert et al., 2005).
Evidence from randomized controlled trials of behavioral interventions, however, is at
best mixed (see McCoy et al. 2010 and Padian et al. 2010 for reviews). No traditional
programs offering some combination of risk-reduction counseling, condom promotion,
referral and treatment for sexually transmitted infections have documented significant
effects on HIV incidence. More recent evidence has shown that financial incentive in-
terventions aimed at promoting safe sexual behavior by conditional payments on HIV or
STI status, or school enrollment, can have an impact, at least when the financial payments
are sufficiently large. For example, Baird et al. (2012) evaluate an intervention where
cash transfers ($120 per year and household) were conditional on school attendance for
adolescent girls. The intervention led to a significant reduction in HIV prevalence after
18 months. De Walque et al. (2012) evaluate a program in Tanzania where cash transfers
were made conditional on remaining negative for a set of curable STI. They document a
significant reduction in STI prevalence in the intervention arm where participants were
eligible for $60 over one year, but not in the arm eligible for $30. Indeed, interven-
tions with relatively small (conditional) financial payments do not appear to result in
measurable reductions in HIV or STI prevalence. Kohler and Thornton (2012) assess an
experiment in Malawi that offered a single cash reward of up to $10 after one year to
individuals who remained HIV negative. The intervention had no measurable effect on
HIV status. Finally, Duflo, Dupas and Kremer (2015) find no impact (even in the longer
run) on STI from an education subsidy program in Kenya, which subsidized the cost
of education for upper primary school students by providing free school uniforms. The
education subsidy combined with HIV prevention education focusing on abstinence un-
til marriage, however, resulted in a significant reduction in STI compared to the control
group.
Our findings have implications for both policy and research. In both biomedical and
behavioral prevention programs, low demand and high costs are often highlighted as
constraining factors for successful scale up. Our evidence suggests that lotteries may
be an effective method to enhance the demand for safer sexual behavior. Such a lot-
tery program could presumably also be employed to increase the demand for effective
biomedical HIV prevention initiatives and could possibly be implemented at lower costs
than traditional CCT programs as only winners need to be paid. Moreover, we show
that a large share of the individuals that changed their behavior in response to the lottery
intervention had a relatively high ex ante risk of getting infected by HIV. Targeting those
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with the highest risk of becoming infected is a key objective in many HIV promotion
programs. Such targeting is also important in many other types of prevention programs.
Thus, our findings open up new avenues for future research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Details on the study setting, the re-
search design, and the intervention are presented in section 2. Section 3 reports the main
results. Section 4 discusses the implications of the findings as well as study limitations.
Section 5 concludes. Additional results are reported in appendix.
II. Experimental design and data
A. Study setting
Lesotho is a small lower-middle-income country with an estimated population of 2.1
million. Poverty is widespread with 43 percent of the population (in 2003) living on
less than $1.25 a day (World Bank, 2014). Lesotho has one of the highest HIV adult
prevalence rate in the world (23.3 percent), with the HIV prevalence rate peaking at 40.5
percent among individuals aged 30-34 (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and ICF
Macro, 2010). Largely due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, life expectancy at birth is low
even by African standards (48 years).
B. Conceptual framework
We designed a financial incentive program – a lottery – with relatively low expected
payments but with high prizes conditional on negative STI test results. As sexually trans-
mitted infections can be viewed as markers for risky sexual behaviors (Crosby et al,
2003; Fishbein and Pequegnat, 2000), our intervention aimed at modifying the trade-off
between the benefit and costs of unprotected sex. If individuals’ decisions on sexual be-
havior ignore the health externality of risky sexual behavior, such a transfer program can
be justified by the negative externalities generated by a higher number of HIV positive
individuals within a society. That is, the (expected) transfer can be viewed as a Pigouvian
subsidy aimed at correcting the externality.
The use of lotteries and thus an uncertain return contingent on behavioral change
makes lottery incentives different from traditional conditional cash transfer (CCT) pro-
grams. Specifically, the expected utility of a lottery with cash prizes depends on individ-
uals’ attitude towards monetary risk. If individuals exhibiting risk-loving preferences in
monetary gambles are also more risk-loving in other domains, including sexual behavior,
lottery incentives may be particularly effective in targeting individuals with the highest
risk of HIV/AIDS.
C. Trial design
The study was a two-year parallel group randomized trial. It had three separate arms
– a control arm with an allocation ratio of 40 percent and two intervention arms - low-
value lottery and high-value lottery - with an allocation ratio of 30 percent each. In the
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low-value lottery arm individuals were eligible to win lottery prizes worth 500 maloti
or approximately $50 every four months conditional on being tested negative for two
curable STIs (syphilis and trichonomiasis). In the high-value lottery arm individuals
were eligible to win lottery prizes of twice that amount (1,000 maloti or approximately
$100), again conditionally of testing negative for syphilis and trichonomiasis.
In expected terms, and conditional on being STI negative, the lottery paid $3.3 every
four months in the low-value lottery group, $6.6 in the high-value lottery group and $4.9
in the pooled intervention group. In the pooled intervention group, and over the two-year
trial period, participants were thus eligible to receive approximately $30 in expectation.
Both lottery prizes represent a meaningful proportion of household income, especially
for women. The study population were primarily shepherds and self-employed workers
and data from the Lesotho Labor Force Survey (2008) show that average monthly earning
in the informal sector was 235 maloti (approximately $23.5) for men and 135 maloti
(approximately $13.5) for women.
The choice to condition the incentives on two curable STIs, rather than directly on
HIV status, was made for both ethical and epidemiological reasons. First, conditioning
incentives on curable STIs allowed individuals testing positive at one round to be eligible
to win in the following rounds, if the individual got treatment and remained STI nega-
tive. Second, conditioning incentives on curable STIs allowed inclusion of HIV positive
individuals in the trial. Risk reduction among HIV positive individuals may have higher
impact on HIV transmission in the community than that of HIV negative individuals.
The choice to condition the incentives on syphilis and trichonomiasis status was based
on the relatively high prevalence of these two STIs in Lesotho and the fact that they are
curable and rapid test technologies are available, practical and affordable. Both STIs
have high co-infection rates with HIV (Johnson and Lewis, 2008; Kalichman, Pellowski
and Turner, 2011).
Similarly to other conditional cash transfer programs aimed at incentivizing safer sex-
ual behavior, the intervention was designed to offer frequent rewards at short intervals
(every 4 months). The short time interval between lottery rounds was intended to bring
the benefits of safe sex closer to the present, which may be important if many individuals
have high discount rates or a limited horizon (Oster, 2012).
D. Participants
Inclusion criteria consisted of males and females, aged 18-32 years, residing in 29
rural and peri-urban villages across 5 districts in Lesotho. Both HIV-positive and HIV-
negative individuals were eligible to enroll. Participation was voluntary but a variety
of channels were used to maximize the interest in the project and boost participation.4
4Although recruitment was based on voluntary enrollment the sample looks similar to the general population of
Lesotho. HIV prevalence rates by age group according to the Lesotho DHS 2009 were: age 15-19: 4.1 percent for
women (2.9 percent for men); age 20-24: 24.1 percent for women (5.9 percent for men); age 25-29: 35.4 percent for
women (18.4 percent for men). HIV prevalence at baseline in our sample was: age 18-19: 5.3 percent for women (1.1
percent for men); age 20-24: 17.6 percent for women (4.2 percent for men); age 25-29: 29.1 percent for women (15.2
percent for men).
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First, a community liaison officer from the implementing NGO visited each participating
community before the beginning of the project to garner support from village leaders.
Second, media channels were utilized in the form of radio announcements through the
most popular local radio stations. Third, posters advertising the project were put up in
visible places to inform the communities about the project. Approximately 40 percent of
the age-eligible population in the targeted villages volunteered to participate in the study,
by coming to the mobile study clinics set up for one week in the centre of the villages.
In total, the various procedures yielded a baseline study sample of 3,427 individuals, of
which 3,029 (88.4 percent) - the core sample - completed baseline interview and tests for
syphilis, trichonomiasis, and HIV.
E. Implementation
Randomization took place at study mobile clinics in each village separately after base-
line interview and STI/HIV testing, with participants selecting one of 10 colored mar-
bles from an opaque bag containing 4 marbles assigning to the control arm, 3 marbles
assigning to the low lottery prize arm and 3 marbles assigning to the high lottery prize
arm. This highly transparent procedure was considered necessary for acceptability of
randomization in the study population.
After completion of the questionnaire and STIs tests, lottery tickets were distributed
to all the individuals who tested negative for both syphilis and trichonomiasis in the
treatment arms. Individuals in the intervention arms testing positive for any of the two
STIs did not receive a lottery ticket. They could, however, continue as study participants
and thus become eligible in subsequent rounds. Individuals in the control arm were
not eligible for lottery tickets, but all other study procedures were identical between the
control and intervention arms. Anyone testing positive for a STI (regardless of arm)
was offered counseling and free STI treatment and individuals tested positive for HIV
were referred to public health clinics offering AIDS treatment for appropriate follow-up.
Individual pre-test and post-test counseling following Lesotho national guidelines was
provided to study enrollees at each testing interval.
Lottery draws, organized every four months in each village, were conducted approxi-
mately one week after the first interview. Four lottery winners (one male and one female
per lottery arm) per village were drawn.5
Over two years, we conducted 7 rounds of data collection. At baseline each individual
received an ID card with a unique identification number that was used to identify the
respondents in subsequent rounds. Each participant received a small in-kind incentive
(candles, matches, and washing powder), worth approximately $3, as a reward for their
participation.
5Except for the four winners, the identity of individuals included in the lottery draws was not revealed and could not
be inferred. The lottery ticket were stored in a closed wooden urn and destroyed after each lottery draw. It was up to the
respondents to disclose their status to their partners or peers/neighbors, if they wanted.
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F. Measurement
All participants were tested for HIV, following the Lesotho national testing guidelines,
at baseline and months 16, 20 and 24. Participants were tested for syphilis and trichono-
miasis at baseline and before each lottery draw.
A baseline and a follow up survey were administered to all participants. The sur-
veys were conducted in private with an enumerator of the same gender as the respon-
dent to mitigate potential reporting biases. The surveys included modules on socioeco-
nomic characteristics, sexual attitudes and behaviors, and knowledge about HIV/AIDS
and other sexually transmitted infections. Participants’ preferences for risk were mea-
sured using a simple multiple price list (MPL) design (Andersen et al. 2008).6 In the
baseline survey, individuals were presented with a question with 15 decision rows. For
each decision row, respondents were asked to choose between a fixed amount, with pay-
ments starting at 0 and increasing by 25 maloti ($2.5) up to 350 maloti ($35), or a risky
lottery with a 50 percent chance to win 500 maloti ($50) or 50 percent chance to receive
nothing. We made clear that we were putting them in a hypothetical situation, but that
they should try to provide an answer that was as realistic as possible.
We create two measures of risk preferences at baseline. First, we construct an indicator
variable ("Risk lover") which takes the value 0 for respondents who preferred a fixed
amount of money below the expected value (of 250 maloti) instead of a lottery with 50
percent chance of winning 500 maloti, and 1 otherwise. Second, we follow Andersen et
al. (2008) and assume a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, u.y/ D
y1 r
1 r , where y is the lottery prize and r is the latent risk coefficient. The point at which
respondents switch from the risky to the safe option are then used to deduce bounds on
the subject’s risk preference (r ).7 We use the midpoints on these bounds as a measure of
the participants’ preferences for risk.
G. Timing
Recruitment and baseline data collection started in February, 2010. The lottery trial
was stopped after two years, following the protocol. A follow-up study was implemented
one year after the intervention ended (February-May, 2013). The time line of the project
is described in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here
III. Results
Baseline characteristics
6The MPL design has been used to elicit risk attitudes by, among others, Holt and Laury (2002) and Tanaka, Camerer
and Nguyen (2010).
7That is, if the respondent chose the risky option when the safe option paid s, but the safe option when safe option
paid s C 25, the bounds are 1  ln.2/ln.500/ ln.sC25/ < r < 1  ln.2/ln.500/ ln.s/ .
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Baseline HIV and STI prevalence rates are reported in Table 1 for the core sample (Panel
A, column 2). At baseline, 16.7 percent of the study participants tested positive for HIV
and 13.5 percent tested positive for any of the two STIs (syphilis and trichonomiasis).8
Consistent with data from the 2009 DHS survey in Lesotho, the HIV prevalence rate was
significantly higher for females (20.4 percent) than males (8.7 percent) and significantly
higher for the older compared to the younger age cohorts. Similar differences were
observed for STI prevalence.
Insert Table 1 here
Baseline characteristics by assignment group are further displayed in columns 3-5.9
Prevalence rates for HIV, and the two curable STIs, were similar across groups (panel
A). The three assignment groups also had similar demographic and socioeconomic char-
acteristics (panel B). Self-reported sexual behavior outcomes (panel C) were also similar
on all but two outcomes – self-reported use of a condom during last intercourse and
self-reported likelihood that the last partner was HIV infected.
In the last rows of panels C and D we report average standardized pre-treatment effects
of the four sexual behavior outcomes; i.e., we estimate a seemingly unrelated regression
system,
(1) Y D [IK 
 T ] C  ;
where Y is a vector of K related sexual behavior outcomes, IK is a K by K identity
matrix, T is a vector of assignment to intervention group(s) indicators and derive an av-
erage standardized pre-treatment effect, Q D 1K
PK
kD1
Ok
O k , where Ok is the point estimate
on the treatment indicator in the k th outcome regression and O k is the standard deviation
of the control group for outcome k (see Kling et al., 2004; Duflo et al., 2008). We find
no significant difference between the treatment groups and the control group using this
aggregate measure of self-reported sexual behavior (denoted "Practice safe sex"). Fur-
thermore, as shown in panel D, among HIV negative individuals at baseline – the main
sample for the HIV incidence analysis – all four self-reported sexual behavior outcomes
- were also similar across assignment groups.
Insert Table 2 here
The attrition rate was low (Table 2), with 95.4 percent (2888 out if 3029) of the par-
ticipants surveyed and tested in the last round and 94.6 percent (2,865 out of 3,029) of
the participants surveyed and tested in the one-year follow-up round. The attrition rate
(5-6 percent) was similar across the three assignment groups and not predicted by any of
83.9 percent of the respondents were tested positive for syphilis while the prevalence of Trichomoniasis was 10.5
percent. To increase precision, we consider the joint measure of syphilis and trichomoniasis prevalence as the main STI
outcome.
9In expectations, 30 percent of the sample should have been assigned to the high and low lottery arm, respectively.
While the share assigned to the high [low] group is higher [lower] than 0.3, we cannot reject the null hypotheses that the
sample comes from a distribution with means 0.3 for each group (results available upon request).
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the baseline socio-demographic characteristics listed in Table 1, panel B, or STI status,
except that HIV positive individuals at baseline were more likely to be lost at follow-up
(41 of 507 or 8 percent of HIV positive individuals at baseline were lost at follow-up).
STIs as markers for risky sexual behavior
The main objective of the intervention was to incentivize safer sexual behavior as a route
to reducing the spread of HIV. The lottery incentives, however, were tied to STI sta-
tus. Table A1 in appendix reports correlations between STI status and HIV status and
self-reported sexual behavior using baseline data. STI-positive individuals were approx-
imately 2.5 times more likely than STI-negative individuals to be HIV positive at base-
line (column 1); i.e., there is a strong positive correlation between STI and HIV status.
Columns (2)-(6) show that STI-positive individuals were also more likely to be involved
in (self-reported) risky sexual behavior. The average standardized effect ("Practice safe
sex") is significantly negative and precisely estimated, providing evidence in favor of the
assumption that prevalence of the two STIs can be viewed as a marker for risky sexual
behavior.
Average treatment effects: HIV and STI
To assess the impact of the lottery intervention, we compare mean outcomes after ac-
counting for stratification. That is, we estimate
(2) yi j D  C L T Li j C H T Hi j C  j C "i j ;
where yi j is a binary variable that for HIV incidence takes value 1 if individual i living
in village j became HIV infected over the trial period and 0 otherwise. For HIV [STI]
prevalence, yi j takes value 1 if individual i living in village j was HIV [STI] positive at
the end of the trial, and 0 otherwise. T L and T H are indicator variables for assignment
to the two intervention groups (low and high lottery group, respectively),  j are village
fixed effects, and "i j is an error term. For the main outcome variables, we report both
robust standard errors as well as the p-values of tests of the null that treatment has no
effect computed using randomization inference. We constructed these p-values using
1000 randomly selected permutations of the randomization allocation. The p-value is
then constructed based on the proportion of test statistic values (squared of the estimated
coefficients) that are greater than the actual test statistic value. We estimate the effects
for the high- and low-value lottery arm and the pooled treatment effect using an OLS
model.
Insert Table 3 here
Table 3 describes the impact of the lottery program on HIV incidence – the primary
study outcome. Over the two-year trial period, the HIV incidence rate was reduced by
2.5 percentage points, or 21.4 percent (column 1), leading to a 3.4 percentage points
lower HIV prevalence rate at the end of the trial (column 3), in the pooled intervention
compared to the control group. Columns (2) and (4) report the effects by intervention
group. Relative to the control arm, HIV incidence fell by 3.3 percentage points, or 28
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percent, in the high prize lottery arm, and by half that size, 1.6 percentage points or 14
percent, in the low prize lottery arm. The HIV incidence rates did not differ significantly
between the two intervention arms. However, the difference in HIV incidence between
the high price lottery arm and the control group was statistically significant while the
difference in HIV incidence between the low price lottery arm and the control group was
not.10
Insert Table 4 here
In Table 4, we report treatment effects by gender. For HIV incidence, the point esti-
mates for the pooled intervention group and the high value lottery arm were statistically
significant in the sample of female participants but not significant in the sample of male
participants. However, we cannot reject the equality of treatment effects for female and
male participants for the pooled intervention group (F-stat=2.09, p-value=0.15 for HIV
incidence; F-stat=0.22, p-value=0.64 for HIV prevalence). Overall the differences be-
tween male and female participants should be interpreted with caution because the study
was not designed to pick up gender specific treatment effects and ex post power calcu-
lations show that the study was not powered to detect effects on HIV incidence for men
only.11
Insert Table 5 here
Table 5 reports the estimated treatment effects on syphilis and trichonomiasis. Two
findings stand out. First, STI prevalence rates fell in all three assignment groups. At
baseline, 13.5 percent of the participants were infected by at least one of the two STIs
(see Table 1). After two years, STI prevalence in the control group is 3.8 percent. This
large reduction in STI prevalence in the control group should be viewed through the lens
of the trial protocol. Regular screening and free treatment of the two STIs were provided
across all three study groups throughout the trial to participants who were tested positive
for STIs. Second, in the intervention groups STI prevalence was essentially zero in
both lottery arms (0.2 percent in the high lottery arm and 0.5 percent the low lottery
arm), implying effect sizes of 89 percent and 82 percent, respectively. Our core sample
consists of HIV negative individuals at baseline. However, participation in the project
was not conditional on HIV status. Columns (5)-(6) of Table 5 show that the lottery
program also affected STI outcomes for the subsample of HIV-positive participants (as
measured at baseline). STI prevalence among HIV-positive participants in the control
group was 11.2 percent (22/196), while no HIV-positive participants in the intervention
arms were tested positive for the two STIs at the end of the trial. Table A4 in the appendix
breaks down the STI results by gender. We document large effects for both the group of
10Adjusted odds-ratios and relative risk ratios are reported in table A2 in appendix. To examine potential bias due to
non-random attrition, table A3 in appendix reports Lee bounds estimates. The significant effects for the pooled lottery
and the high lottery arms remain intact.
11Female and male participants differed in other observables, for example in earnings. The average income earned in
the last month (constructed as the sum of household income, wage and non-wage activities) for men is 200 Maloti (about
20$) and for women is about 60 Maloti (about 6$). The difference in earnings by gender might explain the differential
impact on HIV incidence given that lottery prizes are a higher fraction of earnings for women in the sample.
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male (significant at the 10 percent-level) and female participants (significant at the 1
percent-level).
Sexual behavior and reproductive health
Sexual transmission is responsible for the vast majority of new HIV infections, particu-
larly in Sub-Saharan Africa. The risk of getting HIV infected, in turn, can be reduced in
several ways, including reducing the number of partners/sexual acts, changing the type
of partner, and increasing the use of condoms. In this section we start by studying more
closely these behavioral changes.
We focus on four self-reported outcomes: the number of partners in the last four
months, whether a condom was used in the last intercourse, if the respondent think
his/her last sexual partner was infected by HIV, and whether the last intercourse was
extramarital sex. The results are reported in panel A, Table 6.
Insert Table 6 here
There is evidence of a reduction in risky sexual behavior across all four outcome mea-
sures and the average standardized treatment effect on safer sexual behavior, reported in
column 5, is statistically significant.12 An omnibus randomization test of overall signif-
icance (Young, 2016) confirms the result. The estimated treatment effects are small for
the number of partner, the use of a condom during last intercourse, and the likelihood, as
perceived by the respondent, that the last partner was HIV positive but relatively large and
statistically significant for self-reported extramarital sex (which dropped by 23 percent
in the treatment relative the control group). Thus, with the caveat that sexual behavior is
difficult to measure using traditional survey techniques, the evidence in panel A suggests
that the intervention primarily resulted in changes in the type of sexual partner.13
The primary objective of the intervention was to reduce HIV incidence. However,
a shift towards less risky sexual behavior may also have additional health and socioe-
conomic benefits. The reduction in the prevalence of syphilis and trichonomiasis, as
reported above, is one example. In panel B, Table 6, we assess the effects of two addi-
tional reproductive health outcomes: pregnancy and births. As reported in column (6),
women in the pooled intervention group were 22.3 percent less likely to have given birth
in the last four months or be currently pregnant. Columns (7)-(8) split the sample on
whether or not the woman live in a long-term relationship (here labeled as married ver-
sus unmarried). Pregnancies among single women are more likely to be unwanted and
due to unprotected sex with a non-regular partner. The results on the split sample suggest
that the effect for single women (a reduction by 31 percent) is almost twice as large and
more precisely estimated compared to the effect for married women.14
12
"Practice safe sex" is the average standardized effect of the four individual indicators in panel A, reversing the
sign of "Number of partners last 4 months", "High likelihood last partner HIV+", and "Extramarital sex". Here we are
considering individuals who had sex in the last 4 months, but results are very similar when also including respondents
who did not have sexual intercourse in the last 4 months.
13Recall and social desirability biases in self-reported data on sexual behavior are a general concern, and especially so
when the data are collected within the context of a project involving counseling and testing, as is the case here (Strauss
and Thomas, 1998; Powers et al., 2008; Boily et al., 2009; Corno and De Paula, 2014).
14Equality of treatment effects for unmarried and married women can not be rejected (p-value=0.61).
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Taken together, the findings on self-reported sexual behavior, as well as other repro-
ductive health outcomes, show that behavior changed in response to the intervention
and that these sexual behavioral changes also resulted in benefits apart from those we
primarily targeted.
Heterogeneous effects: Preferences for risk
A better understanding of how to strategically target social behavioral programs to groups
at higher risk of infection is often raised as a priority by policy makers. Apart from spe-
cific groups (commercial sex workers for example), however, little is known about how
to identify and target those at high risk, in particularly in a population at large (UN-
AIDS, 2013). If more risk-loving individuals are also more risk-prone in other domains,
including sexual behavior, the introduction of lotteries into an otherwise standard finan-
cial incentive program may be one way to better target those at higher risk of getting
infected by HIV. In this section we investigate whether there is evidence in favor of such
a mechanism.
Participants’ preferences for risk at baseline were measured using a simple multiple
price list (MPL) design as described in section 2.6. Table A5 in appendix replicates
the 15 tasks presented to participants at baseline and the implied bounds on the latent
risk coefficient r . The midpoints on these bounds are used to measure the respondents’
preferences (r ) for risk. In total, 60 percent of the respondents switched from choosing
the risky lottery to the safe option; i.e. for these respondents we can deduce bounds
on r . The remaining 40 percent of the respondents either choose the safe lottery for
all 15 options being presented, including the first option where the safe option paid 0
(the expected value in the risky lottery was always 250 maloti), or choose the risky
lottery for all 15 options presented, which implies a risk coefficient r <  0:94. While
we cannot rule out that some individuals place a non-pecuniary cost of participating in
a lottery, and thus prefer nothing as compared to a chance of winning, or that some
individuals are highly risk loving, these choices are more likely to be a product of lack
of comprehension of the MPL design. Thus we restrict the sample to the sub-sample of
switchers (for which we can deduce r ). As a robustness test, however, we reestimate all
core specifications with respondents always choosing the safe option coded as risk-averse
(0) and respondents always choosing the risky option coded as risk-lovers (1).
Summary statistics for our two measures of risk preferences at baseline are provided
in Table 1, Panel B. 35 percent of the sample are "risk lover", that is they prefer a lottery
with 50 percent chance of winning 500 maloti compared to a fixed amount of money
greater or equal to its expected value (of 250 maloti). The risk coefficient (r ) is 0.245 on
average, which is lower than that found in Holt and Laury (2002) for university students
in the US (r D 0:27 on average) and Harrison et al. (2010) for poor subjects in Ethiopia,
India and Uganda (r D 0:54 on average), but higher than those reported in Lammers
and van Wijnbergen (2007) for students in South Africa (r D 0:16 on average) and in
Tanner et al. (2005) for Nigerian subjects (r D 0:15 on average). Both measures are well
balanced across treatment arms at baseline.
As individuals that exhibit risk-loving preferences in a monetary gamble may not be
risk-loving in other domains, especially when it comes to sexual behavior, we start by
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investigating whether our measure of risk ("Risk lover") has bearing on risky sexual be-
havior. Table A6 in the appendix compares risk-loving and risk-averse individuals on ob-
servable characteristics at baseline. Risk-averse and risk-loving individuals had similar
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (panel B), but risk-loving participants
were more likely to be HIV positive. Risk-loving participants were also less likely to
report that they practice safe sex (panel C) and have on average a higher STI prevalence
rate (statistically significant at the 10 percent-level) at baseline compared to risk-averse
participants.
Do risk-loving individuals respond differently than risk-averse individuals to the lot-
tery program? In Table A7, we start by regressing HIV incidence on risk attitudes sepa-
rately for each assignment group. Risk-lovers were more than twice as likely to become
infected with HIV over the trial period in the control group (column 1). That is, although
risk-lovers account for about one-third of the sample, they still account for more than
half of the new HIV infections in the control group. In the pooled intervention group,
on the other hand, the share of individuals infected by HIV during the trial period is ap-
proximately the same in the group of risk-loving and risk-averse individuals (column 2).
Similar results are obtained when using the continuous risk coefficient r (columns 3-4).
Insert Table 7 here
Table 7 uses the core sample and an interaction term between the pooled intervention
group and the risk-lover indicator. HIV incidence was 11 percentage points lower for
risk-loving individuals in the intervention relative the control group (column 1). In both
the intervention and control group, HIV incidence among risk-averse is approximately
the same. Column (2) shows that the relationship between risk aversion and risky sexual
behavior remain intact when we replace the indicator variable of risk attitudes with the
continuous risk coefficient r .
Insert Figure 2 here
The relationship between risk aversion and HIV incidence in the intervention and the
control group is graphically illustrated in Figure 2, using a nonparametric Fan local re-
gression method. Consistent with the findings reported in columns (1)-(2), the data sug-
gest that the lottery program lowered HIV incidence in the intervention group by making
risk-loving individuals behave similarly to risk-averse individuals in terms of their sex-
ual behavior; i.e., the effect we observe appears to be driven primarily by the risk-loving
participants. The treatment effect for this sub-group is quantitatively large: individuals
with a deduced risk aversion coefficient one-standard deviation below the mean were 53
percent less likely to have been infected by HIV during the trial period in the intervention
relative to the control group.
Participants’ preferences for risk are not randomly assigned. Thus a concern with the
results reported in columns (1)-(2) is that the treatment effects for risk-loving individuals
reflect differences in demographic and socioeconomic characteristics across participants,
rather than truly stronger response to the lottery incentives for this sub-group. To partly
address this concern we add the full set of baseline demographic and socioeconomic
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characteristics (listed in Table 1, panel B) and STI status at baseline as controls as well as
interactions between assignment to intervention and all additional covariates in columns
(3)-(4). The results remain unchanged, suggesting that differences in demographic and
socioeconomic characteristics and STI status at baseline do not drive the results reported
in columns (1)-(2).
In Table A8 in appendix, we expand the sample by also including individuals that
choose either the safe or risky options for all values of the safe payment in the MPL
question. The main results remain intact, albeit less precisely estimated. If the no-
switching behavior is driven by a lack of comprehension of the MPL design, the inclusion
of the non-switchers will likely attenuate the true effect. The results in Table A8 are
consistent with this interpretation.
Columns (5)-(8) in Tables 7 and A7 show that the results remain broadly intact when
using STI prevalence rather than HIV incidence as dependent variable (although the
result is only significant for the continuous risk coefficient r ). In both the group of
risk-averse and the group of risk-loving individuals we observe large reductions in the
prevalence of any of the two STIs in the intervention as compared to the control group.
All 645 risk-averse individuals and 334 out of 337 risk-lovers (99.1 percent) in the pooled
intervention group were tested STI negative at the end of the project period. In the control
group 5.2 percent (12 out of 232) of the risk-loving individuals and 2.2 percent (9 out
of 406) of the risk-averse individuals were tested STI positive at the end of the trial (see
table A7). For the group of risk-loving individuals this corresponds to a reduction in STI
prevalence of 83 percent.
Longer run effects
The results reported so far were limited to a 24 months program with recurrent village
level lotteries every fourth months, and cannot address the sustainability of the decline
of HIV incidence over a longer period, particularly after the lottery program has been
discontinued. Nor can the results address the possibility of adverse consequences to the
extent that extrinsic incentives may reduce long-term intrinsic motivation to engage in
safe sexual behaviors after incentives have been withdrawn. On the other hand, work
on sexual behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa have highlighted various cultural barriers to
changing behavior (e.g., fatalism, low levels of female bargaining power), and it is pos-
sible that the financial scheme considered here helps overcome these adverse cultural
constraints.
Insert Table 8 here
To assess the longer run effects, a follow-up study was implemented one year after
the intervention ended. The survey was not announced in advance. In the follow-up
study we re-interviewed and re-tested the participants that were screened at the end of
the intervention. Table 8 summarizes the main findings in the first year following the
intervention. As evident, HIV incidence rates were similar across assignment groups in
the year following the trial (column 1). That is, there is no evidence of adverse reactions
or consequences in the intervention relative to the control group, at least based on data
one year after the intervention ended. As a result, HIV prevalence remains significantly
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different between the pooled intervention and control group (column 2) one year after
the intervention ended. We also find lower STI prevalence in the treatment compared
to the control group and the effect is statistically significant. Self-reported practice of
safe sexual behavior one year later has decreased slightly compared to endline (0.027 vs
0.060) and is no longer significant. Similarly, the effect on pregnancy is not statistically
significant.15
IV. Discussion
A. Cost-effectiveness
The lottery program reduced risky sexual behavior at relatively low costs.16 We calcu-
late that the cost of averting a primary HIV infection in the Lesotho trial was $882 based
on cash payments only (cash rewards of $30 per year or $59.4 in PPP in the pooled in-
tervention group). If we add costs related to STI testing and program administration, the
cost per infection averted is estimated at $3,324. As a reference, Kohler and Thornton
(2012) assessed an experiment in Malawi that offered a single cash reward of up to $10
($26.5 in PPP terms) after one year to individuals who remained HIV negative. The in-
tervention had no measurable effect on HIV status; i.e., infinite cost per HIV infection
averted. Baird et al. (2012) evaluated an intervention, also in Malawi, targeting human
capital formation as an alternative HIV prevention strategy. They found that 15 monthly
cash transfers of $10 ($24.5 in PPP) per household and conditional on school attendance
for adolescent girls led to a significant reduction in HIV prevalence after 18 months. The
cost per HIV infection averted was $ 8,333 based on cash payments only, and $12,500
adding the administrative costs. Another conditional cash transfer trial, in Tanzania, that
shares a number of similarities to the Lesotho trial (financial incentives tied to periodic
screening of STIs, free STIs treatment of all trial participants, similar inclusion criteria,
and almost identical prevalence rates for any of syphilis and trichomonas at baseline)
but where the cash rewards were higher and paid with certainty, report STIs prevalence
as the key outcome variable (de Walque et al., 2012). They document a reduction in
STIs prevalence in the treatment arm where participants were eligible for $60 ($178.9 in
PPP) but find no measurable effect on STIs prevalence in the pooled intervention group
where participants were eligible for $40 ($119.20 in PPP) on average. The study was
not powered to directly examine HIV conversion, thus implications for HIV prevention
remain speculative. The cost of averting a STIs infection at the end of the study period
was $2500 based on cash payments only and $8,164 including the STI testing and ad-
ministrative costs. The estimated cost of averting an STI infection in the Lesotho trial
was significantly lower: $645 based on cash payments, $2,943 including STI testing and
administration.
15Results available upon request.
16A comparison of cost-effectiveness across studies should be considered as one input among others in assessing
policy, especially because some interventions may create benefits beyond reducing the risk of HIV infections and because
some interventions may be more context-dependent and sensitive to small differences in program design.
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B. Structured speculation
We show that a financial incentive program designed in the form of a lottery with
low expected payments but with relatively high payments for lottery winners resulted in
significant reduction in HIV incidence. In this section, we discuss how generalizable this
finding is, following Banerjee, Chassang and Snowberg (2017). We ask two questions:
(1) Would the certainty equivalent of the conditional lottery incentive program cause a
similar reduction in HIV incidence? (2) For what types of health behaviors and contexts
would we expect the same results to obtain?
(1) Would the certainty equivalent of the conditional lottery incentive program cause a
similar reduction in HIV incidence?
There are at least two reasons for why a conditional financial incentive program where
participants are rewarded with a chance to win would result in larger reduction in HIV
incidence compared to the certainty equivalent of such a lottery program.
First, there is growing evidence from psychology and behavioral economics that peo-
ple tend to overestimate the probability of rare events, and as a result may prefer a small
chance at a large reward to a small reward for sure (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Kah-
neman, 2011, Barberis, 2013). If so the perceived return from participating in a lottery
may be higher than the return from an incentive program that pays the expected return
with certainty; i.e., conditional payments in the form of a lottery could make the incentive
scheme more high-powered compared to the certainty equivalent.
Second, when the intention is to reduce risky behavior, as is the case here, and in a
population with heterogeneous preferences for risk, lottery incentives may better target
higher-risk individuals; i.e. individuals at higher risk of HIV/AIDS in our setting. A
necessary condition for this to be the case is that individuals exhibiting risk-loving pref-
erences in monetary gambles are also more risk-loving in the domain being incentivized
(here sexual behavior). If so, more risk-loving individuals may be more likely to change
behavior when faced with an incentive program with a chance to win, simply because
the utility value of participating in such a lottery is higher than for more risk-averse
individuals.
Our experiment was not designed to test these mechanisms, nor to compare lotteries
with the certainty equivalent. However, two pieces of evidence suggest that one or both
of these mechanisms are indeed at play.
First, other HIV prevention projects based on conditional incentives with certain pay-
ments and with roughly the certainty equivalent of the lottery program assessed here have
not resulted in significant reductions in the prevalence of sexually transmitted infections
in other low-income countries (see Kohler and Thornton, 2012; and de Walque, et al.,
2012). That is, and contrary to what we find, low powered incentive schemes in expected
utility terms, as is the case here, paid using fixed amounts conditional on testing negative
for markers of risky sexual behaviors, have not been shown to be effective. Second, the
results reported in Table A7 indicate that, at baseline, risk-loving participants, as defined
by their answers to hypothetical monetary gambles, were more likely to be HIV positive
and STI positive and less likely to report safer sexual behaviors compared to risk-averse
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participants; i.e., there is a positive correlation between risk-taking in monetary gambles
and risky sexual behavior. Moreover, the results shown in Table 7 and Table A8 further
suggest that individuals who exhibited risk-loving preferences at baseline were more re-
sponsive to the intervention and constitute a large share of the respondents that changed
their measured behavior in response to the lottery incentives – a result consistent with
the hypothesis that the lottery program targeted those at higher risk of HIV/AIDS.
(2) For what types of health behaviors and contexts would we expect the same results to
obtain?
Low demand for effective health prevention methods are observed in many countries.
How to effectively encourage preventive health behaviors is however less clear. If indi-
viduals systematically overweight low probabilities, or if participation in a lottery yield
direct non-pecuniary rewards, for example by offering participants an element of enter-
tainment or fun, lotteries could be used as a complimentary tool to boost uptake. Such
a prevention scheme is likely to be particularly promising in programs where preventive
health behaviors are relatively easy to measure, such as, for example, programs to en-
courage uptake of immunization and antenatal care visits. Lottery incentives could also
be introduced to increase the demand for other HIV prevention methods, such as HIV
screening and male circumcision, where low demand has been identified as a key barrier
for successful scale-up. Importantly, a lottery program can presumably also be imple-
mented at lower costs than traditional CCT programs as only winners need to be paid.
Permutations of the design, such as only testing winners, could further reduce costs. It
could also increase the scalability and applicability of the lottery incentives, to include
uptake of various prevention goods, such as bednets.
Our findings suggest that lottery-based incentives may be especially attractive when
the aim is to incentivize behavioral changes among risk-loving individuals. Importantly,
however, this hypothesis hinges on the assumption that the behaviors causing the health
risks, whether it is unsafe sex, smoking, or drug consumption, are particularly common
among risk-loving individuals – an assumption that may be difficult to assess ex-ante.
Here, however, we do provide suggestive evidence of that being the case. If this holds
true in other settings, lottery incentives, properly designed, could, for example, be used
to encourage uptake of various promising biomedical prevention interventions, such as
pre-exposure prophylaxis to reduce HIV infection risks, which in most settings would
require that individuals at high risk can be identified and reached.
C. Study limitations
The lottery intervention may have influenced outcomes through other channels than
the ones we stress above. For example, a public lottery event every four months could
have highlighted the role of prevention in the community. This channel, though, presum-
ably influenced all study participants, independent of assignment arm. Moreover, the
experimental evidence on traditional prevention programs (for example risk-reduction
counseling, condom promotion, referral and treatment for sexually transmitted infec-
tions) have not documented significant effects on HIV incidence.
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A large, albeit uncertain, payment may also be preferable to a lower but certain pay-
ment flow if consumers face saving constraints and cannot purchase an indivisible good
out of current income. However, this mechanisms cannot account for the heterogeneous
results we present, unless less risk-averse individuals also are more likely to face saving
constraints.
Finally, our design, where assignment to treatment was randomized within villages,
does not allow us to estimate spillover effects. Such spillover effects are likely important
and correctly estimating them is crucial to properly assess cost-effectiveness. But it
would also require a design that randomize treatment at a more aggregate level. As
a reduced transmission risk would affect participants in both the intervention and the
control group, the treatment estimates we report in the paper do not capture the indirect
spillover effects of a lower transmission risk among (all) participants.
V. Conclusions
The extremely high social and economic cost of the HIV/AIDS epidemic motivates the
continued search for innovative and cost-effective prevention approaches. In this paper
we investigate the effects of introducing a gamble into an otherwise standard financial
incentive program. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first large scale randomized
trial that assesses the impact of lottery as an HIV prevention tool. We find that the lottery
program resulted in a significant reduction in HIV incidence. We further show that a
large share of the individuals that changed their measured behavior in response to the
intervention exhibited risk-loving preferences at baseline. This finding is consistent with
the hypothesis that lotteries are more valued by individuals willing to take risks. Thus,
our findings provide suggestive evidence that lotteries can be used to target groups at
higher risks of getting HIV infected.
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